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CONFLICT OF NORMS OR CONFLICT OF LAWS?: 
DIFFERENT TECHNIQUES IN THE 
FRAGMENTATION OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 
RALF MICHAELS* & JOOST PAUWELYN 
INTRODUCTION 
“International law is a legal system.”1 Thus begins the first of the 
forty-two conclusions formulated by the International Law Commission 
(ILC) Study Group on the fragmentation of international law.2 The 
sentence is more a postulate than an actual conclusion, and a disputed one 
at that. After all, much of the current discussion on the fragmentation of 
international law is motivated precisely by the suspicion that international 
law might actually not be a system, at least not an internally coherent one 
the way we think of domestic legal systems. The Study Group thus 
postulates an answer to an ontological question—whether international law 
actually is a system—in order to answer the technical question of how to 
deal with conflicts and interrelation between its rules.3 
This is difficult enough for the kind of conflicts that the report 
identifies as the most relevant ones: conflicts between “principles that may 
often point in different directions . . . new types of treaty clauses or 
 
       *     Professor of Law at Duke University School of Law. 
         Professor of International Law at the Graduate Institute of International and Development 
Studies in Geneva, Switzerland. 
This article is an attempt to see whether we can find common ground from our different starting points. 
For Ralf Michaels, this starting point lies in a project, currently pursued with Karen Knop and Annelise 
Riles, on Private International Law as a general theory of law. Some thoughts in this article draw on 
discussions from that larger project. See Karen Knop, Ralf Michaels & Annelise Riles, From 
Multiculturalism to Technique: Feminism, Culture, and the Conflict of Laws Style, 64 STAN. L. REV. 
589 (2012). For Joost Pauwelyn, this work emerges from his earlier work on conflict of norms in 
international law, in particular the role of general international law for the WTO. See infra note 7. The 
article has previously been published. Ralf Michaels & Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms or Conflict 
of Laws?: Different Techniques in the Fragmentation of International Law, in MULTI-SOURCE 
EQUIVALENT NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 19 (Tomer Broude & Yuval Shany eds., 2011).  
 1.  U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 10, Rep of the International Law Commission, para. 251, 
U.N. Doc. A/61/10 (2006) [hereinafter ILC Fragmentation Report]. 
 2.  Id. at paras. 233-51. 
 3.  See generally MARIO PROST, THE CONCEPT OF UNITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2012). 
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practices that may not be compatible with old general law or the law of 
some other specialized branch.”4 The discovery of Multisource Equivalent 
Norms (MSEN)5 suggests that the challenge is even more fundamental: 
even where rules in different regimes do not point in different directions, 
the question which of them is applicable remains. This suggests that the 
fragmentation of international law does not only imply a plurality of 
values; it also implies a plurality of techniques. 
The assumption for many participants in the debate, what we call here 
the ontological question—whether international law is a coherent system—
has not only technical but predominantly normative implications, or is even 
itself, really, a normative question. There exists a widespread normative 
preference for coherence over fragmentation, order over disorder, system 
over plurality. We do not go so far as to claim that the question of whether 
international law is a coherent system or not is normatively irrelevant. 
However, we do think that its normative implications are overrated, and 
that the main problems with fragmentation are technical, not normative, in 
nature. If the resolution of conflicts were only possible within a coherent 
system, then the question of whether international law is such a system 
would have direct normative implications. If, by contrast, it can be shown 
that conflicts can be resolved also in the absence of one coherent system, 
then what looked like a normative question becomes a technical one: the 
prime question is then which of different types of technical rules we have 
to apply to deal with the conflict. 
The ILC Report rightly points out that, in order to deal with 
fragmentation, it is “useful to have regard to the wealth of techniques in the 
traditional law.”6 The rules it refers to, and limits its inquiry to, are rules 
concerning conflicts within a legal system. We refer to this approach as 
“conflict of norms,” with reference to the title and type of analysis 
conducted by one of us in an earlier book.7 These rules are rules on 
hierarchical relations, presumptions of statutory interpretation, and 
principles of balancing (e.g., on how different rules within Belgian law 
interrelate). Use of these rules appears to presuppose that international law 
is a system comparable to a domestic legal system. Indeed, it appears 
 
 4.  Study Group of the International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: 
Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, para. 15, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr.13, 2006) [hereinafter Koskenniemi Report].  
 5.  For additional information on MSEN, see Tomer Broude & Yuval Shany, The International 
Law and Policy of Multi-Sourced Equivalent Norms, in MULTI-SOURCE EQUIVALENT NORMS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (Tomer Broude & Yuval Shany eds., 2011) . 
 6.  ILC Fragmentation Report, supra note 1, para. 250.  
 7.  See generally JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2003). Note that ‘norms’ is here not opposed to law. 
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scholars often want to see international law as a system (rather than a 
pluralist or fragmented agglomeration) in part because this makes it 
possible to apply traditional conflict of norms rules (such as the principles 
of lex posterior or lex specialis). When the report of the ILC Study Group 
discusses ideas of legal pluralism, for example, it does so with the concern 
that such pluralism will be incompatible with the systematic approach and 
the rules on conflict of norms it encompasses.8 Its main author, Martti 
Koskenniemi, has elsewhere expressed his normative concerns over such 
pluralism.9 
As a matter of fact, rules to deal with pluralism exist, and conflict-of-
norms rules are not the only set of rules for conflicts. Another set of rules 
in “traditional law” concerns conflicts between legal systems (which we 
will refer to as “conflict of laws” or “private international law” solutions). 
These rules are typically rules of domestic law that determine which of 
several domestic substantive laws should apply (e.g., whether Belgian or 
German law applies to a fact pattern), according to certain factors, for 
example, the location of the object in question or the nationality of the 
parties. 
Both sets of rules—“conflict of norms” rules and “conflict of laws” 
rules—were traditionally developed with regard not to international law but 
to domestic legal systems. Rules on hierarchical relations between rules 
and on systematic statutory interpretation were created within the context 
of domestic legal systems. Rules on conflict of laws are also mostly rules 
of domestic law (though they have at least in part been derived from 
principles of international law10), but they have been applied to conflicts 
between the laws of different states, not to conflicts between different 
treaties. Such conflict-of-laws rules have occasionally been considered for 
public international law, too. In 1953, Wilfred Jenks argued that “some of 
the problems which [conflicts between treaties] involve may present a 
closer analogy with the problem of the conflict of laws than with the 
 
 8.  See Koskenniemi Report, supra note 4, para. 488. 
 9.  See, e.g., Martti Koskenniemi, Global Legal Pluralism: Multiple Regimes and Multiple 
Modes of Thought (Mar. 5, 2005), available at http://www.helsinki.fi/eci/Publications/Koskenniemi/ 
MKPluralism-Harvard-05d[1].pdf. A more positive assessment of such International Law pluralism is 
offered by David Kennedy, One, Two, Three Many Legal Orders: Legal Pluralism and the 
Cosmopolitan Dream, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L & SOC. CHANGE 641 (2006-2007). On relations between 
international law and legal pluralism, see, more generally, Ralf Michaels, Global Legal Pluralism, 5 
ANN. REV. LAW. & SOC. SCI. 243, 249-50 (2009); Iulia Voina-Motoc, Conceptions of Pluralism and 
International Law, in 2 SELECT PROCEEDINGS OF THE EUROPEAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
401 (Hélène Ruiz Fabri et al. eds., 2008).  
 10.  See Alex Mills, The Private History of International Law, 55 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1 (2006); 
see also Ralf Michaels, Public and Private International Law: German Views on Global Issues, 4 J. 
PRIV. INT’L L. 121 (2008). 
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problem of conflicting obligations within the same legal system.”11 Philip 
Jessup, in his famous lectures on transnational law, also discussed the 
problem of applicable laws before international tribunals as one of choice 
of law and compared it explicitly with the task of the national judge in 
determining which law to apply.12 More recently, Andreas Fischer-Lescano 
and Gunther Teubner have developed the idea that the national 
differentiation of law is now overlain by a sectoral differentiation and that 
conflicts between sectoral laws—regimes—must, like conflicts between 
national laws, be dealt with through a system of conflict of laws.13 One of 
us, in a relatively early book on the subject, briefly considered but rejected, 
for the time being, a private international law approach.14 
That said, extensive discussions of when and how a private 
international law approach would actually work to resolve public 
international law conflicts do not exist. Jenks discusses conflict avoidance 
more than conflict resolution. Jessup uses tools that are not those of conflict 
of laws. Fischer-Lescano and Teubner argue that the special character of 
conflicts among regimes requires the development of substantive norms, 
without a satisfactory explanation as to why exactly this should be so.15 
Moreover, there is relatively little discussion on which of these two 
approaches is to be preferred under what circumstances. The reason may be 
that scholars writing in the field start from a certain assumption on the 
ontological challenge—in other words, that international law is or should 
be a coherent system, or that it is not—and derive rules from that 
assumption. 
In this article, we do not set out to place the ontological question of 
whether international law is a system at the beginning of the research. 
Rather, we begin with a presentation of the two different approaches and a 
discussion of the prerequisites for their respective applicability (Parts I and 
II). We then discuss how these two approaches map discussion of 
fragmentation of international law, without actually, at this stage, 
prioritizing one over the other. If anything, our claim would be that public 
international law conflicts are likely sui generis, with aspects of both 
conflict of norms and conflict of laws, and that to resolve this type of 
 
 11.  C. Wilfred Jenks, The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 401, 403 
(1953); see also id. at 405-06. 
 12.  See generally PHILIP JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW, 72-113 (1956). 
 13.  Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal 
Unity in the Fragmentation of International Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 999, 1020-21 (2003-2004); 
GUNTHER TEUBNER, CONSTITUTIONAL FRAGMENTS: SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
GLOBALIZATION 154-58 (2012). 
 14.  Pauwelyn, supra note 7, at 8-10. 
 15.  Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 13, at 1022-23. 
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conflict one can learn and borrow from both approaches (Part III). Finally, 
we take on the question of what this means for the systematic nature of 
international law (Conclusion). All through this article, we do not offer a 
systematic analysis, but rather a number of examples to demonstrate the 
existence, and usefulness, of two very different sets of conflict rules.16 
An important message of this article for public international lawyers is 
this: the now frequently voiced unease amongst public international 
lawyers with traditional conflict-of-norms rules17 is best answered with 
private-international-law solutions. Although certain traditional conflict-of-
laws rules cannot be used tel quel because the connecting factors they rely 
on—places, people, governmental interests—cannot be applied to regimes, 
functionally refined conflict-of-laws rules promise to be more helpful. 
Another core message of this article, targeted this time at a private-
international-law audience, is that conflict of laws can operate not only 
between the laws of states but also to resolve public international law 
conflicts, but not all of them and in a contextually adapted fashion. 
I. INTERACTIONS WITHIN LEGAL SYSTEMS: CONFLICT OF 
NORMS 
A. Solutions in Domestic Law 
Legal systems provide their own tools to establish their internal 
coherence.18 More than one rule may a priori be applicable to a set of facts. 
Institutionally, internal coherence is established mainly through highest 
courts. Doctrinally, the solution lies in legal rules that determine the 
 
 16.  In all of this, we restrict our analysis to questions of applicable law. That is, we are not 
concerned with the question of which tribunal, if any, has jurisdiction. Nor do we address here the 
extent to which the jurisdictional question affects the question of the applicable law or vice versa. On 
questions of jurisdiction, forum non conveniens and other domestic law principles, see generally YUVAL 
SHANY, THE COMPETING JURISDICTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (2003); Tomer 
Broude, Fragmentation(s) of International Law: Normative Integration as Authority Allocation, in 
TOMER BROUDE & YUVAL SHANY, THE SHIFTING ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: CONSIDERING SOVEREIGNTY, SUPREMACY AND SUBSIDIARITY (2008), and Joost Pauwelyn & 
Luiz Eduardo Salles, Forum Shopping Before International Tribunals: (Real) Concerns, (Im)Possible 
Solutions, 42 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 77 (2009). 
 17.  See, e.g., Pauwelyn, supra note 7, at 367-80 (referring to “the fiction of ‘legislative intent’” 
and difficulty of putting a time-label on a treaty in the context of the lex posterior principle as it applies 
in public international law); see also Koskenniemi Report, supra note 4, para. 255 (“[T]he argument 
from lex posterior or lex specialis [both conflict-of-norms rules] seems clearly more powerful between 
treaties within a regime than between treaties in different regimes. In the former case, the legislative 
analogy seems less improper than in the case of two treaties concluded with no conscious sense that 
they are part of the ‘same project.’”). 
 18.  See generally Ken Kress, Coherence, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL 
THEORY 533 (D. Patterson ed., 1996). 
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relation between different norms. European law in the civil law tradition 
(which historically relied less on courts to establish internal coherence 
procedurally) has been particularly robust in developing a number of 
presumptions of statutory interpretation to resolve conflicts between norms, 
but similar solutions are found in the common law. 
A first set of conflict rules acts at the level of hierarchy of norms. 
Thus, under the rule of lex superior derogat legi inferiori, the hierarchically 
superior rule trumps the hierarchically inferior. It is for this reason that 
constitutional law trumps ordinary statutory law, which in turn trumps 
common law rules. Mandatory rules of contract law trump party 
agreements and these agreements in turn trump subsidiary rules of contract 
law. 
Where no such hierarchy of sources exists and rules are enacted in the 
same field, for example in contract law, a second set of conflict rules must 
be developed. As between more general and more specific rules, for 
example, the one with the more specific scope of application applies (lex 
specialis derogate lege generali). Thus, general contract law is trumped by 
the specific rules on consumer contracts on the one hand or by those on 
commercial contracts on the other. Under the rule of lex posterior derogat 
lege anterior, a later rule is presumed to trump an earlier rule. Both lex 
specialis and lex posterior are presumptions as to the intent of the 
lawmaker or legislator on the issue in question. Presumably, a lawmaker, in 
regulating a specific area, wants to create special rules that trump the 
general rules in the field. As a consequence, the presumption is that the 
latest and/or most specific legislative expression matters and prevails. 
According to the literal rule, similar terms in different statutes are in 
principle presumed to have the same meaning. 
Finally, where rules with different functions are in conflict, the above, 
second set of conflict rules is of limited use. For example, rules of 
intellectual property may conflict with rules of antitrust law. Intellectual 
property rules give the owner a monopoly over a certain intangible good, 
whereas antitrust law sets out to combat monopolies. Rules on freedom of 
speech may conflict with rules on personal dignity. The solution in most 
legal systems is one of balancing of interests, though this has frequently 
been criticized. 
B. Prerequisites 
All of this is well-known. What is sometimes underappreciated is the 
extent to which the above ‘conflict of norms’ rules work smoothly only 
insofar as we can assume that (i) all legal rules in play coexist within a 
single overarching system and (ii) the decision which rule to apply can be 
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imputed, albeit by fiction, to a unitary lawmaker with a coherent legislative 
intent. This is why these rules are traditionally applied within legal 
systems, not between legal systems, and in a universe with a unitary 
lawmaker, not with many lawmakers. 
Thus, the lex superior principle requires a common system within 
which a hierarchy of norms can be established; it does not function 
between systems. Take, for example, the famous Yahoo! Case decided in 
2000.19 In that case, French courts decided, essentially, that Yahoo!, a 
Californian company, could be banned from enabling the auctioning of 
Nazi literature on its internet auction site, even though such a ban would be 
in conflict with the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Some 
authors have criticized this decision with the suggestion that the conflict 
between a statute and a constitutional rule should be resolved in favor of 
the constitution.20 Such reasoning would be perfectly adequate if the 
conflict had arisen within one legal system, either between the French 
Constitution and a French statute, or between the U.S. Constitution and a 
U.S. statute. By contrast, where the conflict exists between a statute and a 
constitution of two different legal systems (with two ‘lawmakers’ 
independent from each other), the argument becomes unconvincing, 
because no hierarchical relation exists: the French legislator is not subject 
to the requirements of the U.S. Constitution, and the U.S. Constitution does 
not, on its own force, reach into France. This does not mean that the French 
court should not have considered the U.S. Constitution at all, nor that the 
status of the U.S. Constitution should play no role; only that the basis for 
this cannot be found in the lex superior principle. 
Presumptions of statutory interpretation, which work well among rules 
on the same level of hierarchy within one system, are similarly dependent 
on the presumption of a uniform legislator, even if this presumption is 
fictitious. As between legal systems, they lose much of their plausibility. 
For example, the lex specialis rule is grounded in the presumption that a 
legislator, in regulating a specific case, wants to carve out an exception 
from the general rules existing for a set of matters.21 As between countries 
or between national laws, it is hard to make a similar presumption. The 
French hate speech statute is more specific than the First Amendment, but 
 
 19.  L'Union des Etudiants Juifs de France v. Yahoo! Inc., Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] 
[ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, Nov. 20, 2000, JurisClasseur Periodique, édition générale 
– La Semaine Juridique 2000, 2219, obs. J. Gomez, available at www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/ 
tgiparis20001120.pdf. 
 20.  See Ayelet Ben-Ezer & Ariel L. Bendor, Conceptualizing Yahoo! v. L.C.R.A.: Private Law, 
Constitutional Review, and International Conflict of Laws, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 2089, 2112 (2004). 
 21.  See Bruno Simma & Dirk Pulkowski, Of Planets and the Universe: Self-contained Regimes in 
International Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 483, 485-87 (2006). 
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it does not follow at all that it should therefore take priority as an exception 
to the First Amendment. Similar limitations exist for the lex posterior rule. 
The rule makes sense within one legal system, because the legislator can be 
presumed to legislate with knowledge of prior laws and thus with reference 
to those laws. This assumption is less warranted between legal systems.22 It 
seems quite implausible to argue, for example, that the U.S. Constitution 
must stand back merely because it is older than the French statute in 
question. Similarly, the assumption that similar terms in different statutes 
have a similar meaning (the ‘literal rule’) makes sense within one legal 
system that strives for internal consistency because we can presume that the 
unitary lawmaker means the same thing with similar terms. The assumption 
is much harder to make between different legal systems. For example, as 
comparative lawyers have often warned us, contract in English law is not 
the same as contrat in French law;23 it is not even the same as contract in 
U.S. law. 
Finally, the balancing between rules serving different functions (e.g., 
Belgian intellectual property law versus Belgian antitrust law) is in 
principle linked to intra-systemic reasoning as well. Rational balancing 
requires an objective standard for the respective weight of each principle to 
be balanced.24 If that standard cannot be derived from the intent of a unitary 
legislator, it must come from somewhere else, for example, a uniform 
standard of welfare maximization. As between legal systems, the problem 
is that the difference between the conflicting norms is typically a 
consequence of the fact that each of the systems uses a different “objective 
standard” to define, weigh and ultimately balance the conflicting principles 
within its own system. Simplistically speaking, the U.S. values freedom of 
speech higher than the need to ban anti-Semitic speech; the result of 
balancing speech and dignity within French law is different. Since 
balancing is a function of the relative weight of different principles,25 and 
this relative weight may be different within different legal systems, 
balancing between legal systems will often not resolve the conflict between 
 
 22.  A partial exception exists where statutes are written in explicit reaction to foreign laws, for 
example British blocking clawback statutes against U.S. judgments. See LAWRENCE COLLINS, Blocking 
and Clawback Statutes: The United Kingdom Approach, in ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION 
AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, 333, 333-34 (1997). Here it is clear that these statutes trump U.S. law 
within the British legal system, though this in itself is obviously not binding on U.S. law. 
 23.  See Catherine Valcke, Divergence and Convergence among English, French, and German 
Conceptions of Contract, 16 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 29, 34-35 (2006). 
 24.  See Robert Alexy, Balancing, Constitutional Review, and Representation, 3 INT’L J. CONST. 
L. 572, 574-75 (2005). 
 25.  See Jacco Bomhoff, Balancing the Global and the Local: Judicial Balancing as a 
Problematic Topic in Comparative (Constitutional) Law, 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 555, 
584-85 (2008). 
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these different balancing results. Brainerd Currie in particular, as the 
inventor of the governmental interest analysis in the field of conflict of 
laws, opposed such balancing between legal systems precisely for this 
reason, because it ignored the policy choice made by the forum’s legislator. 
In his view, a judge cannot balance the interests of its own legislator 
against those of another.26 Indeed, most methods of conflict of laws 
(though not all)27 oppose open balancing of interests and instead focus on 
the relative strength of policies. Similarly, the idea of finding a mix 
between different regimes, which Fischer-Lescano and Teubner propose for 
public international law conflicts, has been proposed occasionally as a 
solution for traditional choice-of-law problems.28 However, most conflict-
of-laws approaches eschew a mixture or compromise between different 
laws and instead designate either one or the other state’s law to apply. 
II. INTERACTIONS BETWEEN LEGAL SYSTEMS: CONFLICT OF 
LAWS 
A. Solutions in Domestic Law 
One reason, then, for why conflicts between different legal systems 
are governed by different rules than are conflicts within one legal system, is 
that the rules developed for intra-systemic conflict do not work well in the 
context of inter-systemic conflict. There is no hierarchy among different 
legal systems, except for the relative hierarchy that each system may claim 
for itself over others. There is no overarching system within which rules on 
statutory interpretation could achieve coherence. There is no uniform 
legislative intent on which the resolution could be based. There is no 
neutral or mutually accepted standard under which different values could 
be balanced. 
The alternative is not anarchy but private international law. In private 
international law, several methods exist on how to resolve conflicts 
between legal systems. With gross simplification, it may be appropriate to 
present three methods: the traditional method, governmental interest 
analysis, and functional analysis. While the first two are tied to conflicts 
between state laws, the third one is more promising for international law. 
 
 26.  See Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE 
L.J. 171, 177. 
 27.  See, e.g., J.H.C. Morris, The Proper Law of a Tort, 64 HARV. L. REV. 881, 890 (1951) 
(endorsing “balancing of the interests of the states whose law is involved.”). 
 28.  See, e.g., Arthur T. von Mehren, Special Substantive Rules for Multi-State Problems, 88 
HARV. L. REV. 347, 370-71; Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Development and Incorporation of 
International Norms in the Formation of Copyright Law, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 779-81 (2001). 
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The first method, here called the traditional method, exists in both 
Europe and the United States, with some differences that need not concern 
us here.29 Under the traditional method, the applicable law is determined on 
the basis of conflict-of-laws rules designed for different areas of law in the 
abstract, without regard to the content of the substantive law. Essentially, 
determining the applicable law is a three-step endeavor. In a first step, the 
matter in question must be characterized as one of contract law, tort law, 
procedure, etc., so the applicable choice-of-law rule (e.g., that for contract 
or tort) can be determined. In a second step, application of this choice of 
law leads to the determination of the applicable law on the basis of a 
connecting factor. Most of these connecting factors are either territorial (the 
place of the tort for matters of tort, the place of performance for matters of 
contract law, etc.) or personal (the law of nationality or of domicile for 
matters of personal status, etc.). In a third and final step, the law so 
determined is applied unless its application would violate the public policy 
of the forum law. 
A good example of this three-step analysis is provided by the Supreme 
Court of Delaware in Folk v. York-Shipley, which applied this inter-
systemic method to a conflict between the laws of different U.S. states.30 
The plaintiff, a Delaware domiciliary whose husband had died in a car 
collision in Pennsylvania, sued for loss of her husband’s consortium.31 
Such a cause of action existed in Delaware’s law but not in Pennsylvania’s 
law.32 The court first had to characterize this issue as one of tort law 
(liability for a car accident) or one of family law (injury to a marriage): a 
tort claim would be governed by the law of the place of the injury, whereas 
a family law claim could arguably have been governed by the law of the 
common spousal domicile, which was Delaware.33 Once the issue was 
characterized as one of tort law, in a second step the place of the injury had 
to be determined and was determined to be the place of the car accident 
(Pennsylvania), not the place where the wife lived and where arguably her 
consortium was lost (Delaware).34 In a third step, finally, the Delaware 
court determined that the law of Pennsylvania applied.35 The court did not 
 
 29.  For some of these differences, see Ralf Michaels, The New European Choice-of-Law 
Revolution, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1607, 1610-16 (2008). 
 30.  Folk v. York-Shipley, Inc., 239 A.2d 236 (Del. 1968). Note that private international law 
rules apply not only among the laws of different nation states but also among the laws of different states 
of the United States. 
 31.  Id. at 237. 
 32.  Id. at 238. 
 33.  Id. at 238-39. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. at 239-40. 
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discuss, though it could have, whether Pennsylvania law would remain 
inapplicable because it violated a fundamental policy of Delaware.36 
A second approach, developed in opposition to the traditional method 
described above, is called governmental interest analysis.37 The starting 
point for this method is the “governmental” interest of a state in having its 
own law applied.38 Hence, the substance of the respective laws provides the 
starting point of the analysis (though their respective quality or desirability 
is not normally a criterion). Here, the first step is to determine which rules 
of law claim applicability, in view of both their text and of whether the 
respective legislative intent would be furthered by their application. If more 
than one state is interested in having its law applied and their laws differ, 
the resulting “true conflict” must be resolved, and various suggestions have 
been made for how such a conflict can be resolved. 
Perhaps the most important such solution is that of “comparative 
impairment:” as between two conflicting laws, the judge should apply the 
law that would be more impaired by non-application.39 An example can be 
seen in Tucci v. Club Méditerranée SA.40 Tucci, a Californian citizen, had 
been injured during his employment at a vacation camp operated by French 
defendant Club Méditerranée in the Dominican Republic.41 Under 
California law, Tucci had a tort claim because Club Méditerranée had no 
insurance with a company authorized in California.42 Under the law of the 
Dominican Republic, by contrast, workers compensation was the only 
available remedy.43 The court held that the law of the Dominican Republic 
established a quid pro quo between employers and employees by giving 
employers easy access to compensation while shielding employers from 
tort liability.44 This quid pro quo would be severely impaired if Tucci was 
granted a tort claim under Californian law.45 By contrast, if the law of the 
Dominican Republic applied and Tucci’s claims were limited to those 
under workers compensation, California’s interest would be insignificantly 
impaired: California’s interest in making sure that employers are 
 
 36.  See id. 
 37.  SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, AMERICAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 95-102 (2008); see 
generally Currie, supra note 26.  
 38.  See SYMEONIDES, supra note 37. 
 39.  See William A. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 17-18 
(1963). 
 40.  Tucci v. Club Mediterranee, S.A., 89 Cal. App. 4th 180 (2001). 
 41.  Id. at 184. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. at 187. 
 45.  Id. at 190-92. 
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adequately insured was fulfilled because Club Méditerranée in fact had 
insurance, albeit with a French, not a Californian insurer.46 Except for the 
insurance requirement, California provides for a quid pro quo comparable 
to that in the Dominican Republic.47 As a result, the law of the Dominican 
Republic was applied.48 Note that the court was not balancing policies; it 
balanced governmental interests.49 
Finally, more recent methods of conflict of laws adopt variants of a 
functional perspective, even though the meaning of such a term and the 
method discussed under it differ among different authors and courts. In 
England, this means that the court should look for the proper law, the law 
most appropriate to govern the issue in question.50 In the United States, 
Arthur von Mehren and Donald Trautman developed a multifaceted method 
to determine the applicable law on the basis of a number of factors, 
including the relevant strength of the policies of the involved states, a 
comparative evaluation of the asserted policies, a commonly held multi-
state policy, and the degree of effective control each state has over the 
matter.51 In Europe, a functional approach led not to a rejection but a 
refinement of the traditional approach.52 The three steps of the European 
approach outlined above were maintained but disentangled from the idea 
that the applicable law should be based on the power of the state over its 
territory and its citizens. In all of these functional approaches, the search is 
ultimately for the most appropriate law, the law with the closest connection 
to the facts, considering a variety of factors. 
B. Prerequisites 
The above conflict-of-laws methods, different though they are, are 
quite closely linked to relations between different legal systems. They do 
not function well for intra-systemic conflicts. To explain why this is the 
case we must engage in a somewhat more elaborate discussion because the 
reasons are slightly different for each of the approaches discussed. 
The traditional method is hard to apply to intra-systemic conflicts for 
two reasons. First, the approach presumes that the conflict occurs between 
 
 46.  See id. at 190-91. 
 47.  See id. at 193-94. 
 48.  Id. at 194. 
 49.  See id. at 191-94. 
 50.  See F. A. Mann, The Proper Law in the Conflict of Laws, 46 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 437, 437-38 
(1987). 
 51.  ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN & DONALD T. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS 
76-79 (1965) summarized in SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION: 
PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 28-29 (2006). 
 52.  See Michaels, supra note 29, at 1612-16. 
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two legal orders that are essentially complete, insofar as each of them must 
have rules in the same area of law: tort law, contract law, etc. Where, for 
example, the issue is characterized as one of tort law, the conflict is 
between two tort laws (e.g., those of Pennsylvania and Delaware). 
Although such situations exist also, occasionally, within legal systems 
(e.g., between general contract law and consumer contract law), a second 
reason makes the traditional approach difficult to apply to almost all intra-
systemic conflicts. Under the traditional approach, the applicable law is 
determined through either a territorial or a personal connecting factor, and 
such factors are often absent within legal systems.53 The distinction 
between general contract law and consumer contract law, for example, 
cannot be made on the basis of territorial factors because they are not 
territorially distinct. It can be made on the basis of personal factors, 
depending on whether one party is a consumer or not.54 Yet other 
conflicts—that between nuisance as a tort and property, for example—
cannot. 
Governmental interest analysis, in turn, is hard to apply to intra-
systemic conflicts for a related reason: it assumes the coexistence of two 
governments whose interests are in question and potentially in conflict. As 
between two systems, each with its own government, it may be possible to 
determine which government has the greater interest. Within one legal 
system, this is impossible, as long as, at least in theory, the same 
government or “lawmaker” is concerned. 
The relative inadequacy of conflict-of-laws approaches for intra-
systemic conflicts is no coincidence. Both the traditional method and 
governmental interest analysis are catered specifically to conflicts between 
states. The choice of connecting factors—territory, citizenship, 
governmental interests—mirrors closely the classical definition of the state 
as based on three elements: a territory, a population, a government 
structure.55 In international law, by contrast, even where we can speak of 
different sub-systems or branches of international law, such as World Trade 
Organization (WTO) law and human rights law, these are not defined by 
territory or personality; and, neither WTO law nor human rights law has its 
 
 53.  They have become problematic also for conflicts between domestic laws because of the 
diminished role of territoriality. See Ralf Michaels, Territorial Jurisdiction After Territoriality, in 
GLOBALISATION AND JURISDICTION 105, 115-17 (Piet Jan Slot & Mielle Bulterman eds., 2004). 
 54.  Strictly speaking, the relevant factor is not a personal one, because what is characterized is 
not the person (is the person a consumer or not?) but the transaction (is it a consumer contract or not?). 
 55.  Ralf Michaels, Globalizing Savigny? The State in Savigny's Private International Law and the 
Challenge of Europeanization and Globalization, in AKTUELLE FRAGEN ZU POLITISCHER UND 
RECHTLICHER STEUERUNG IM KONTEXT DER GLOBALISIERUNG 119, 128-37 (Michael Stolleis & 
Wolfgang Streeck eds., 2007). 
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own government with conceivable governmental interests, so the criteria 
developed in these particular conflict-of-laws approaches are not applicable 
as such. Moreover, in conflicts between states, the use of such factors 
makes it possible to allocate issues among states precisely because these 
states resemble each other structurally and functionally—each state 
displays these abstract criteria, each state generally performs the same 
functions. Within one system this method is often inapplicable because 
different statutes, or different sectors of the law, do not display the same 
structure and do not perform the same function. If, for example, Belgian 
general contract law and Belgian consumer law performed the same 
functions, one of them would be redundant and likely abolished. 
The functional approach to conflict of laws appears to be less open to 
such criticism. The search for the proper law (or norm) and the designation 
of the applicable law (or norm) on functional grounds, appear, to some 
extent, to be possible regardless of whether we are within one system or 
between systems. Indeed, in this sense, the functional approach to inter-
systemic conflicts is in many ways not so different from the functional 
approach to intra-systemic conflicts discussed above. However, differences 
do exist. First, in intra-systemic conflicts, the focus is on balancing laws 
(recall the IP versus antitrust law example); in inter-systemic conflicts, it is 
on balancing respective regulatory interests (recall the notion of 
comparative impairment). Second, in intra-systemic conflicts, the 
functional approach aims at coherence; in inter-systemic conflicts, it aims 
at coordination. Third, in intra-systemic conflicts, a functional approach 
can lead to mixed or compromise solutions; in inter-systemic conflicts, the 
aim is to maintain the internal integrity of each system by designating one 
or the other, and to minimize the consequences of frictions. 
III. INTERACTIONS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Which of the above approaches is more adequate for conflicts within 
public international law or for fragmented public international law? At first 
sight, the core question may seem to be whether international law is more 
like one system or more like the combination of several systems: if it is one 
system, we should use a conflict-of-norms approach; if it is a combination 
of systems, we should use a private international law approach. 
We do not think this is the most useful order of steps. Whether 
international law behaves like a system or not is in no small part 
determined by the very way in which relations between rules are handled. 
If we choose intra-systemic rules to govern relations between, say, the 
international trade and climate change regimes, this very choice constructs 
international law as a system. If we choose inter-systemic rules to address 
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interactions, this constructs public international law as a plurality and a 
uniform system of public international law no longer emerges. This 
suggests, however, that we need not start with the ontological question (Is 
public international law one system or not?). Instead, we can start by 
addressing the pragmatic question of which rules work best for different 
contexts (conflict of norms or conflict of laws?) and determine in the light 
of the answers how to understand public international law. 
A. General International Law and Treaties 
One important type of interaction between rules of international law is 
that between treaties and general international law. Treaties, ratified by 
explicit consent by a certain number of states, are akin to contracts or 
contractual regimes. For example, the WTO Treaty56 and the Kyoto 
Protocol57 bind only the states that agreed on and ratified those treaties. 
General international law (to some extent akin to codes and statutes or 
common law) encompasses the rules that states are “born into’” and that 
are binding on all states irrespective of explicit consent and subject matter. 
For example, general international law rules on treaty interpretation or state 
responsibility are by default applicable in both the context of the WTO and 
the Kyoto Protocol. General international law includes customary 
international law and general principles of law. To some extent, it includes 
also quasi-constitutional norms, in particular, jus cogens, from which no 
treaty can deviate. 
For interactions and conflicts between treaties and general 
international law, intra-systemic conflict rules work well. The reason is 
simple but deserves repeating: this type of interaction closely resembles the 
interaction of rules within a single legal system. If general international law 
and, in particular, rules of jus cogens exist at all, they must by necessity, in 
order to be general, exist within—or constitute—a legal system. Denying 
the systemic character of international law implies denying the existence of 
general international law. Notably, the absence of a unitary lawmaker or 
source of authority is no counterargument—the unitary lawmaker is 
assumed as a fiction, as in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention, which 
refers, to the ‘international community of States’ as the creator of jus 
cogens.58 
 
 56.  See, e.g., Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 
1867 U.N.T.S. 154. 
 57.  See, e.g., Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148. 
 58.  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 344 
[hereinafter VCLT]. For the counterfactual nature of international community, see David C. Ellis, On 
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In this intra-systemic constellation, the lex superior rule as we know it 
within domestic legal systems can be used for hierarchical relations. Jus 
cogens is then the “higher law” prevailing over all other rules of the 
international law “system.” In this sense, Article 53 of the Vienna 
Convention, which provides that “[a] treaty is void if, at the time of its 
conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international 
law,”59 states little more than a definitional truism. This hierarchical 
structure—jus cogens trumps treaties—does not, in and of itself, resolve 
conflicts, because it does not define whether a given rule of general 
international law is jus cogens (and thus trumps treaties) or not. The notion 
of hierarchy itself does not even implicate that there must be any rules of 
jus cogens at all. However, it does capture that to the extent that rules 
belong to jus cogens, conflicts between them and treaties are questions of 
hierarchy within a legal system. 
Similarly, lex specialis, another intra-systemic conflict rule discussed 
above, works well for interactions between general international law and 
specific treaties (such as the WTO treaty). This is made explicit, for 
example, in Article 55 of the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility 
(generally considered part of customary international law), which explicitly 
confirms, under the heading of “lex specialis,” that “[t]hese [Draft] articles 
do not apply where and to the extent that the conditions for the existence of 
an internationally wrongful act or the content or implementation of the 
international responsibility of a State are governed by special rules of 
international law.”60 
Finally, the presumption against conflict and the principle of 
“systemic integration,” as they are known in international law,61 are (much 
like the intra-systemic literal rule discussed earlier’) built on the premise 
that the legislator or specific group of contracting states must be presumed 
not to want to deviate from, or contradict, an earlier expression or rule. 
Again, for the intra-systemic type of interaction between general 
international law and treaties, this presumption fits well. We can presume 
that, for example, two states that conclude a treaty did so with the 
 
the Possibility of ‘‘International Community’’, 11 INT’L STUD. R. 1 (2009). See also Berit Bliesemann 
de Guevara & Florian P. Kühn, The “International Community” – Rhetoric or Reality?, 27 SICHERHEIT 
UND FRIEDEN/SECURITY AND PEACE 73 (2009). 
 59.  VLCT, supra note 58, at art. 53. 
 60.  Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 53 sess, Apr. 23-June 1, July 2-Aug. 10, 2001, UN Doc 
A/56/10, at 58 (2001); see also id. at 140-41. 
 61.  See VCLT, supra note 58, at art. 31(3)(c), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340 (directing that when 
interpreting treaties there must be “taken into account, together with the context: … (c) any relevant 
rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties”). On systemic integration, see 
also ILC Fragmentation Report, supra note 1, at para. 17.  
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background of general international law, to which they are both bound, in 
mind. 
B. Conflicts Within One Branch of International Law 
Similar considerations apply to norm relations within one branch of 
international law, such as within the WTO system or within the realm of 
the law of the sea.62 For example, pursuant to Article XVI:3 of the 
Agreement Establishing the WTO, this Agreement prevails over all other 
agreements within the WTO—an application of the intra-systemic lex 
superior principle.63 Pursuant to the lex specialis rule, specific agreements 
on trade in goods (say, Agriculture) prevail over the more general rules in 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Article 311.1 of the 
1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS)64 confirms the lex 
posterior principle when stating that “[t]his Convention shall prevail, as 
between States Parties, over the Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea 
of 29 April 1958.” In these cases, it is possible to assume a fictitious WTO 
or UN law of the sea “legislator.” Granted, the actual negotiating parties 
change constantly—countries join and leave treaties as the United States 
did with UNESCO, withdrawing in 1984 and rejoining in 2003,65 or China, 
which left the GATT in 1950 and joined the WTO in 2001.66 Nonetheless, 
there is still enough institutional coherence, continuity, and memory to 
make the fiction of a unitary lawmaker plausible. 
A broader application of the intra-systemic lex posterior rule is found 
in Article 30 paragraph 3 of the Vienna Convention: for parties bound by 
two treaties, “the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions 
are compatible with those of the later treaty.” Interestingly, the very title as 
well as paragraph 1 of Article 30 state explicitly that this lex posterior rule 
applies only between “treaties relating to the same subject matter.” This 
suggests that the rule was written mainly with intra-systemic conflicts in 
mind, that is, successive treaties, within the same field or branch of 
 
 62.  We leave open the question what exactly constitutes a sub-branch of international law. 
 63.  “In the event of a conflict between a provision of this Agreement and a provision of any of 
the Multilateral Trade Agreements, the provision of this Agreement shall prevail to the extent of the 
conflict.” Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization , Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 
art. XVI at para. 3. 
 64.  “This Convention shall prevail, as between States Parties, over the Geneva Conventions on 
the Law of the Sea of 29 April 1958.” United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 
1833 U.N.T.S. 397 at art. 311, para. 1. 
 65.  See U.S. Support to UNESCO: Past and Present, U.S. MISSION TO UNESCO, available at 
http://unesco.usmission.gov/mission/support.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2012). 
 66.  See Press Release, WTO Secretariat, WTO Successfully Concludes Negotiations on China’s 
Entry (Sept. 17, 2001), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/pr243_e.htm.  
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international law, broadly speaking.67 Indeed, although the lex posterior 
rule has occasionally been used to resolve conflicts between two branches 
of international law, this creates some unease. Take GATT for example. 
The original GATT68 was concluded in 1947 so that the later Treaty of 
Rome69 or Montreal Protocol70 would arguably prevail over it; yet, when 
GATT 199471 was concluded, did this mean that GATT rules now all of a 
sudden trump the earlier mean that GATT rules now all of a sudden trump 
the earlier EC Treaty or Montreal Protocol? And that with the recent 
Lisbon Treaty72 GATT must in turn give way? One way to alleviate this 
unease is to rank the lex specialis principle above the lex posterior rule, so 
the more specific EC Treaty then prevails over GATT irrespective of 
GATT’s timing. Yet, on what basis is one to decide that a treaty or specific 
norm is “more specific”? Another option is to deny that in those situations 
we are talking about “successive” treaties in the first place (so that Article 
30, by its very terms, does not apply) on the ground that either or both of 
these treaties are ‘continuing’ or ‘living’ treaties without a single time-label 
on them, making it impossible to rank the treaties chronologically.73 
Another, perhaps easier, explanation follows from our discussion earlier: 
Article 30 and lex posterior should presumptively not apply to interactions 
between different branches of international law because those interactions 
are more akin to inter-systemic conflict, a type of conflict not well-suited 
for application of the lex posterior principle. 
C. Conflicts Between Branches of International Law 
The most pressing problems of public international law fragmentation 
concern conflicts between functional sub-systems or branches of 
 
 67.  That said, the “same subject matter” in Article 30 could also be interpreted more broadly as 
covering any situation where two norms conflict or overlap including, for example, norms from 
different branches, such as trade and environmental treaties or NAFTA and WTO law. If they so 
conflict, can one not presume that they cover the “same subject matter”? See Pauwelyn, supra note 7, at 
364. However, when applying the lex posterior rule to successive treaties in different fields or branches, 
the rule is often less convincing. Id. at 377; Koskenniemi Report, supra note 4, at 15; see also 
discussion supra note 16. 
 68.  See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter 
GATT]. 
 69.  See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 
11. 
 70.  See Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 1522 
U.N.T.S. 3. 
 71.  See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187. 
 72.  See Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing 
the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 50. 
 73.  See Pauwelyn, supra note 7, at 489-90; Joost Pauwelyn, Bridging Fragmentation and Unity: 
International Law as a Universe of Inter-Connected Islands, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 903, 908-09 (2004). 
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international law—trade and environment, finance, and human rights, etc. 
This is the context in which traditional intra-systemic conflict rules have 
proven unsatisfactory. As noted earlier, the mechanical lex posterior rule 
does not work well for conflicts between EU and WTO law or between 
GATT and multilateral environmental treaties and leads to surprising and 
often unconvincing results. The same is often true with respect to the lex 
specialis principle. How is one to decide whether, for example, a restriction 
on trade in an endangered species is more specifically covered by a WTO 
rule (as a trade matter) or by a Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) provision (as an 
environmental matter), given that no neutral higher authority exists to make 
this decision? And should treaty parties be able to undermine their WTO 
obligations merely by formulating a specific rule? This is, in our view, in 
no small measure due to the fact that this type of conflict is more akin to 
inter-systemic conflict for which intra-systemic conflict rules such as lex 
posterior and lex specialis were not designed. 
There are two reasons for why intra-systemic rules may be inadequate. 
The first is that the fiction of the unitary lawmaker, a prerequisite of these 
rules as we saw earlier, becomes increasingly implausible in the modern 
context of highly specialized, functional regimes. International trade, 
investment, environment, and human rights law, with each of their own 
international institution and/or club of negotiators, enforcement 
mechanisms, epistemic communities, related national ministries, NGOs, 
and even academics, make it increasingly difficult to assume a unitary 
lawmaker with a sufficient sense of institutional coherence, continuity, and 
memory across these different branches. As a result, application of the 
intra-systemic rules of lex superior, lex posterior, or lex specialis and the 
related quest for the genuine intent of international law’s “unitary 
lawmaker” have become increasingly strenuous.74 This raises the obvious 
question whether and when to shift from such conflict-of-norms rules to 
conflict-of-laws rules. 
The second reason, related to the first, is that when it comes to 
tensions between branches of international law, it becomes difficult to 
devise a neutral perspective from which neutral conflict solutions could be 
formulated. Instead, each branch typically has its own rules or perspective 
for dealing with conflicts, and these rules or starting points often differ. For 
example, as noted earlier, there may be little point in trying to define the 
lex specialis in the interaction between trade agreements and environmental 
agreements. From the perspective of the trade agreement, the trade rule will 
 
 74.  Cf. Simma & Pulkowski, supra note 21. 
MICHAELS_PAUWELYN EIC5 MACRO - TO PO (DO NOT DELETE) 5/21/2012  8:55 PM 
368 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 22:349 
be more specific (as in “trade in” environmentally sensitive goods); from 
the viewpoint of the environmental treaty, the environmental rule will be 
more specific (as in “environmental concerns” related to trade). 
Sometimes, this neutrality problem becomes explicit in the text of 
conventions. GATT Article XXIV, for example, states that regional trade 
agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
are subject to certain GATT principles, thereby setting up the GATT as lex 
superior. Article 103 of NAFTA, in contrast, explicitly states that in the 
event of conflict between GATT and NAFTA, NAFTA prevails. A similar 
tension exists between Article 103 of the UN Charter, setting up Charter 
obligations as leges superiores, and the WTO rule that WTO panels may 
not “add to or diminish” from WTO covered agreements which some have 
read as a conflict rule defining WTO law as lex superior.75 Other examples 
illustrating the problematic nature of lex superior in inter-systemic-type 
conflicts encompass interactions between UN and EC treaties, EC law and 
the European Convention on Human Rights, UNCLOS and WTO law, etc. 
The problem of applying lex superior in this context is reminiscent of the 
Yahoo! example discussed earlier and the impossibility of establishing a 
hierarchy between a French statute and a U.S. constitutional rule.76 
Sometimes, balancing is suggested as a solution. However, as 
discussed earlier, balancing as a conflict rule may work well within a 
system but not between sub-systems or branches of international law. If 
both international trade tribunals and environmental tribunals each engage 
in rational balancing, in the absence of a common, objective standard 
(available essentially only within a single “system”) the value judgments 
involved in balancing are likely to lead to different results, depending on 
the values or perspectives inherent in the trade system as opposed to the 
environmental system. For example, when the WTO balances trade against 
environmental protection under GATT Article XX, the environment is set 
up as an exception for which the burden of proof rests on the country 
attempting to protect the environment. In addition, environmental measures 
may only trump trade liberalization rules in case they are “necessary” and 
there is no “less trade restrictive alternative” available.77 Before an 
environmental tribunal, the opposite would likely be true, with, for 
example, environmental protection as the rule, and trade liberalization as 
the exception. 
 
 75.  Lorand Bartels, Applicable Law in WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings, 35 J. WORLD 
TRADE 499, 507-09 (2001). 
 76.  See generally L'Union des Etudiants Juifs de France v. Yahoo! Inc., supra note 19. 
 77.  See GATT, supra note 68, at Article XX3(b).  
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This suggests that to the extent conflicts between sub-branches of 
international law become more akin to inter-systemic conflicts, applying 
the intra-systemic conflict rules of lex superior, lex specialis, lex posterior, 
or balancing becomes more strenuous. If scholars have clung to such rules 
nonetheless, the reason may well be their fear that the alternative would be 
some unorganized legal pluralism. If it can be shown that inter-systemic 
rules, if and where appropriately applied, can provide a certain degree of 
coordination, such fears might be alleviated. 
Here, we can only sketch some such possibilities. One would be to 
develop private-international-law rules on the basis of connecting factors, 
except that these connecting factors cannot be those of territory or 
personality (as in domestic, inter-systemic-conflict rules) but must be 
functional, institutional, and/or procedural connecting factors pointing 
toward one branch of international law rather than the other (e.g., as the 
“proper law”). Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, who advocate a somewhat 
comparable approach, argue that any solution of the conflict cannot result 
in an either/or decision but must somehow combine aspects of both 
regimes, because most conflicts have relevant effects within more than one 
sub-system.78 But effects within more than one system are characteristic of 
traditional private-international-law situations between states, too. In the 
example from the Delaware court discussed earlier,79 the claim for loss of 
consortium undoubtedly has effects in both tort and family law, and in both 
Pennsylvania and Delaware. Here, the goal is not to determine whether the 
issue is “really” one of tort or one of marriage law (it clearly touches on 
both), but instead which law is more appropriately applied. Similarly, in 
international law, we would not ask whether an issue “really” belongs to 
trade or environmental law, but rather, which regime is more appropriate to 
be applied to the particular fact pattern. Applying the trade rather than the 
environmental regime is not a simple preference of trade interests over 
environment interest, but a preference of the decision in the trade regime on 
the role of environmental concerns over the decision within the 
environmental regime on the role of trade. This is a question not confined 
to “true conflicts;” it is a question also where the different regimes provide 
norms that are equivalent, in other words, the case of multi-sourced 
equivalent norms (MSEN), discussed below. 
Arguably, this is what really goes on when international tribunals 
exercise the jurisdiction to “interpret the submissions of the parties” so as 
to “isolate the real issue in the case and to identify the object of the 
 
 78.  Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 13, at 1021-22; see now, for further discussion, 
TEUBNER, supra note 13, at 154-58. 
 79.  See Folk v. York-Shipley, Inc., 239 A.2d 236, 238 (Del. 1968). 
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claim.”80 We can also find such a search for the “closest connection” in the 
decision in Southern Bluefin Tuna.81 The tribunal in that case did not think 
the conflict belonged only to one or the other regime, as “it is a 
commonplace of international law and State Practice for more than one 
treaty to bear upon a particular dispute.”82 Nonetheless, because the dispute 
was “centred” in the 1993 Convention for the Conservation of Southern 
Bluefin Tuna, that Convention became the basis for the decision. The 
tribunal did not deny that the conflict also “arose” under UNCLOS.83 
Rather, it concluded that “[t]o find that, in this case, there is a dispute 
actually arising under UNCLOS which is distinct from the dispute that 
arose under the [1993 Convention] would be artificial.”84 
Another example of an inter-systemic-conflict rule operational in 
international law can be derived from Article 22 of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD), which holds that 
 
[t]he provisions of this Convention shall not affect the rights and 
obligations of any Contracting Party deriving from any existing 
international agreement, except where the exercise of those rights and 
obligations would cause a serious damage or threat to biological 
diversity.85 
 
The provision shows that the CBD does not claim absolute superiority over 
other treaties (as noted earlier, in inter-systemic-type conflicts this self-
positioning as lex superior would likely be futile). The CBD does claim 
priority only where a serious damage or threat to biological diversity must 
be expected. This rule can be explained as an application of the public 
policy exception. Article 22 does not resolve conflicts universally, because 
the competing treaty might simultaneously claim priority, but it does 
provide a structure for addressing these conflicts from the perspective of 
one regime in a way to minimize the conflict. 
A different kind of hands-off-approach-within-limits for inter-
systemic-type conflicts can be found in the now well-established Solange II 
approach to the interaction between German constitutional law and EC law, 
 
 80.  Nuclear Tests Case (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 262 (Dec. 20); Nuclear Tests Case (N.Z. 
v. Fr.) 1974 I.C.J. 457, 466 (Dec. 20); Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Can.) 1988 I.C.J. 432, 448 (Dec. 
4). 
 81.  Southern Bluefin Tuna (N.Z. & Austl. v. Japan) Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 13 
R.I.A.A. 1, 40-44 (2000). 
 82.  Id. at 40. But see the forceful separate opinion by Sir Kenneth Keith. Id. at 49-57. 
 83.  See id. at 41. 
 84.  Id. at 42 (emphasis added). 
 85.  Convention on Biological Diversity art. 22, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79. 
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as well as between the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in the Bosphorus case.86 Each of those 
regimes could have a legitimate claim to superiority; yet, as discussed, 
when faced with inter-systemic conflicts, such claim risks having little 
effect. Instead, a certain accommodation was found where each of these 
regimes or courts recognized the other but added that, where the 
encroachment becomes too serious, superiority will be reclaimed—not with 
binding force for the other regime, but only by each side for itself. Where 
the encroachment is not serious, there is a presumption of equivalence 
among the different regimes (a case of MSEN) that facilitates deference. 
Consider finally the Preamble of the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety.87 The Preamble first invokes the principle of mutual support 
among trade and environment agreements.88 Applying this principle, it 
maintains that the Protocol “shall not be interpreted as implying a change 
in the rights and obligations of a Party under any existing international 
agreements,”89 especially the WTO. However, in the very next paragraph, 
we find that the Protocol is not subordinated to the WTO.90 This text 
displays a desire to maintain intra-systemic coherence and consistency, and 
in its great abstraction also shows the limits of such a desire. It may, at 
times, be more appropriate to treat the conflict between trade and 
environment as one more akin to inter-systemic conflict. From this 
perspective, the principle of mutual support could then be read as the 
principle of comity which provides the historical basis for conflict of laws 
between states. Conflict of laws has become much more refined; an 
invocation of comity is rarely necessary in view of the fine-grained 
conflict-of-laws rules and approaches we have.91 A similar development 
may be more attractive for the relationship between trade and environment, 
instead of the solutions centred in interpretation and hierarchical 
subordination, which the Protocol has in mind, and which tend towards 
circularity. 
 
 86.  See generally Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 22, 
1986, BVerwGE 73, 339 (Ger.), translated in 3 COMMON MKT. L. REP. 225 (1987); Bosphorus Hava 
Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v. Ireland, App. No. 45036/98 42 EUR. H.R. REP. 1 (2005); 
cf. Karen Knop, Ralf Michaels & Annelise Riles, International Law in Domestic Courts: A Conflict of 
Laws Approach, 103 ASIL PROC. 269 (2010). 
 87.  See generally Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, Jan. 29, 2000, 2226 U.N.T.S. 208. 
 88.  Id. at pmbl., para. 9. 
 89.  Id. at pmbl., para. 10. 
 90.  See id. at pmbl., para. 11. 
 91.  See, e.g., Michaels, supra note 9, at 247-49. 
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D. Multi-sourced Equivalent Norms 
Finally, what does all of this mean for multi-sourced equivalent 
norms? In our view, a method borrowed from conflict of laws appears 
particularly fruitful for MSEN, because the problem addressed by MSEN is 
familiar in that field. MSEN have been defined as rules that are “(1) 
binding upon the same international legal subjects; (2) similar or identical 
in their normative content (in the words of the ILC, ‘point in the same 
direction’); and (3) have been established through different international 
instruments or ‘legislative’ procedures or are applicable in different 
substantive areas of the law.”92 In focusing on rules that point in the same 
direction, they fill a gap left open by the ILC Fragmentation Report that is 
addressed almost exclusively at rules pointing in different directions.93 This 
distinction between rules pointing in different directions and rules pointing 
in the same direction is discussed, in governmental interest analysis 
(explained earlier), as the distinction between true and false conflicts. True 
conflicts describe situations in which the policies of different states are in 
conflict. (This definition is in accordance with more recent definitions of 
conflict in international law, which go beyond rules that cannot be obeyed 
at the same time and include rules that pursue different goals.)94 False 
conflicts, by contrast, describe situations in which either only one of the 
two policies is implicated, or—and this makes for the parallel with 
MSEN—where the policies of both states or of both regimes are 
congruent.95 The typical solution is then for the court to apply forum law. 
MSEN exist both within and between sub-systems of international 
law. For example, “national treatment” as MSEN can be found in the WTO 
and in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), spread across 
the branches of trade and investment law. At the same time, national 
treatment is also sprinkled as a principle in various WTO agreements 
within the WTO regime. Equivalent rules on the use of force, as addressed 
in the Nicaragua case,96 are set out in custom and in treaties, within the 
same “system” or in the intra-systemic interaction between general 
international law and treaties defined earlier. In the context of investment 
arbitration, similar principles may be set out in an investment contract 
 
 92.  Broude, supra note 5, at 5. 
 93.  See Koskenniemi Report, supra note 4, at paras. 23-24. 
 94.  See generally Erich Vranes, The Definition of “Norm Conflict” in International Law and 
Legal Theory, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 395 (2006). 
 95.  Cf. Anthony J. Colangelo, Universal Jurisdiction as an International “False Conflict” of 
Laws, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 881 (2009) (discussing false conflicts and suggesting a different application 
in international law). 
 96.  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Jurisdiction 
and Admissibility 1984 I.C.J. 392, 435 (Nov. 26). 
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under domestic law as well as in the bilateral investment treaty (BIT) under 
international law, that is, across the national and international “systems.” 
Yet, we submit that the problem dealt with under the title of conflict of 
norms or conflict of laws is structurally capable of accounting at least for 
some types of MSEN as well. 
One example for the treatment of MSEN can be found in Art. 
189.4(a)-(c) of the EC Chile Free Trade Agreement (Chile-EU FTA):97 
 
(a) When a Party seeks redress of a violation of an obligation under the 
WTO Agreement, it shall have recourse to the relevant rules and 
procedures of the WTO Agreement, which apply notwithstanding the 
provisions of this Agreement. 
(b) When a Party seeks redress of a violation of an obligation under this 
Part of the Agreement, it shall have recourse to the rules and procedures 
of this Title. 
(c) Unless the Parties otherwise agree, when a Party seeks redress of a 
violation of an obligation under this Part of the Agreement which is 
equivalent in substance to an obligation under the WTO, it shall have 
recourse to the relevant rules and procedures of the WTO Agreement, 
which apply notwithstanding the provisions of this Agreement. 
 
The rule seems to have been written under the assumption of a relation 
of hierarchy vis-à-vis the WTO. Such a relation is not necessary, as the 
example of NAFTA-WTO showed. And indeed, rules 4(a) and 4(b) display 
a strong sense of an inter-systemic approach more prone to conflict-of-laws 
rules than conflict-of-norms rules. Thus, both Articles 4(a) and 4(b) base 
the applicable law on the close connection between obligations under a 
treaty and the rules and procedures connected with them, an approach in 
tune with the traditional method of conflict of laws that designate entire 
legal systems, not just individual norms, to apply. 
The most interesting provision in this context, however, is Art. 4(c) of 
the Chile-EU FTA with its special regime for MSEN. Here, the otherwise 
necessary connection between rule and context is given up. Instead, the 
provision adopts an approach comparable to governmental interest analysis 
of laws, where the situation described would be viewed as a false conflict: 
not a situation in which only one regime is interested in the application of 
its law, but a situation in which the application of one law in fact furthers 
the interests of the other regime as well. Under governmental interest 
 
 97.  Agreement Establishing an Association Between the European Community and Its Member 
States, of the One Part, and the Republic of Chile, of the Other Part art. 189, para. 4(a)-(c), Nov. 18, 
2002, available at www.trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/november/tradoc_111620.pdf (emphasis 
added). 
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analysis, such situations are typically resolved in favor of forum law: New 
York is free to apply its own wrongful death statute if doing so furthers 
also the policies of Massachusetts. Here, the resolution is in favor of the 
rules of the WTO, but structurally this is not different. In both cases, one 
law—forum law in the domestic conflict-of-laws analysis, WTO law in the 
WTO-FTA context—is presumably applicable, but under certain 
conditions, in particular a difference in the relevant policies, a deviation 
can be justified. 
This example suggests more generally that, at least for some types of 
MSEN, a conflict-of-laws approach may be appropriate. The idea that 
equivalent rules exist in different regimes (such as national treatment in the 
WTO and Chile-EU FTA) is familiar from an inter-systemic context, 
namely from comparative law. In comparative law, the functional method 
presumes that different legal systems will contain, if not similar then at 
least functionally equivalent, rules (e.g., on contracts or tort), because each 
legal system is internally complete and thus needs to respond to essentially 
the same challenges as every other legal system.98 Both the French and the 
English have laws dealing with questions of enforcing contractual 
consensus; the question in conflict of laws is which of the two is 
applicable. The same situation occurs in international law, for example, as 
between NAFTA and the WTO, or the Chile-EU FTA and the WTO: both 
aim at resolving, essentially, the same challenges (in this case, nationality-
based discrimination in an economic context). They contain MSEN 
because they are not perfectly integrated. Thus, to the extent international 
law develops more or less complete regimes in parallel (albeit centered on 
limited principles such as national treatment or non-discrimination), a 
conflict-of-laws approach seems most promising. This is the link between 
MSEN and the conflict-of-laws alternative, suggested in this article. 
CONCLUSION: IS INTERNATIONAL LAW A SYSTEM 
So far, we have deliberately discussed the technical question—the 
respective adequacy of different sets of rules for different types of public 
international law conflicts—without addressing the ontological question 
whether international law is a system. The result has been that international 
law can actually borrow rules from both, and that different sets of rules are 
better for different types of conflicts. This means that the normative 
implications of whether international law is a system are actually not that 
 
 98.  See generally Ralf Michaels, The Functional Method of Comparative Law, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006) 339. 
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great. Nonetheless, the question remains relevant, and some implications 
emerge from our analysis. 
One tendency seems to be this: interactions between treaty-regimes 
(e.g., the WTO) and general international law (e.g., the law of treaties or 
state responsibility) are better resolved with rules made for intra-systemic 
conflicts and relate to international law as a “system.” Similarly, conflicts 
within branches of international law, for example within the WTO treaty, 
appear to benefit from intra-systemic rules and thereby suggest that it 
makes sense to conceive of the WTO as a (sub-)system. 
In contrast, for interactions between specialized treaty regimes (say, 
environmental law versus trade law), traditional intra-systemic rules do not 
always provide satisfactory frameworks for analysis. However, as we 
demonstrate above, this emergence of different sub-systems or legal 
pluralism need not result in anarchy. Rather, coordination between these 
branches or sub-systems can occur, albeit imperfectly, through inter-
systemic conflict-of-laws rules. This suggests that in these aspects 
international law is better seen as an unsystematic plurality of systems or 
regimes, without the need for conceiving of these systems as self-
contained. 
What does this mean for the question whether international law is a 
system or not? First, we have seen that the question is far less important 
than the drafters of the ILC Fragmentation Report appear to have thought, 
because the technical question—which set of rules is adequate for which 
type of interaction between rules—can be answered without recourse to 
this ontological question. Second, to the extent that the answers to the 
technical question allow for conclusions, they suggest that it is useful to 
conceive of international law as a system for some aspects and as the 
interaction of various systems in others. It suggests that one set of conflicts 
rules—conflict-of-norms rules—is appropriate for one set of conflicts, and 
another set of conflicts rules—conflict-of-laws rules—is appropriate for the 
other. The criticism of international law as a system thus has it half right: 
international law is not a full-fledged system, and traditional conflict-of-
norms rules are not always appropriate to resolve public international law 
conflicts. However, this finding does not lead to anarchy but instead into 
another set of conflicts rules. 
International law may, therefore, be a system at some level (in the 
sense, for example, that all of its rules and branches interact and are 
governed by certain general rules without there being so-called self-
MICHAELS_PAUWELYN EIC5 MACRO - TO PO (DO NOT DELETE) 5/21/2012  8:55 PM 
376 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 22:349 
contained regimes),99 but a universe of different systems, sub-systems or 
branches at another level (in the sense, for example, that rules within the 
WTO treaty interact differently than a WTO rule interacts with the Kyoto 
Protocol). The outcome is not chaos and anarchy but a more sophisticated 
legal landscape, consequence of, to use the very title of the ILC Study 
Group, “the diversification and expansion of international law.” Put 
differently, applying private international law solutions to public 
international law conflicts—or recognizing that certain conflicts of 
international law may be more akin to a conflict between Belgian and 
German law than a conflict between one Belgian norm and another—need 
not mean the end of international law. On the contrary, it highlights the 
increased maturity and complexity of international law and its unique, 
hybrid features as a sui generis type of legal order. 
If all of this is correct, then the first question for relations between 
international law norms, or regimes, is neither whether international law is 
a system or not, nor which norm or which regime should prevail, if any. 
The first question is which approach should be used to resolve the conflict, 
that of conflict of norms or that of conflict of laws. This question cannot 
and need not be determined with regard to an ontology of international law; 
it must be established anew for many new conflicts. The dynamic and 
evolutionary character of international law makes it unlikely that the 
internal differentiation of international law either is static or follows a 
predetermined path. The dependence of international law on its actual 
practice suggests that how we resolve certain conflicts has an effect on the 
very nature of these conflicts. How we resolve conflicts determines what 
international law is. This is one more reason for why we should think hard 
before blindly applying the conventional wisdom of conflict-of-norms. As 
international law diversifies and matures, some public international law 
conflicts may well be best resolved through private international law 
solutions. This article opens the way for such an alternative approach. 
Elaborating specific conflict-of-law rules for certain public international 
law conflicts is the logical next step. 
 
 
 99.  Or as the ILC Study Group puts it: ‘Its rules and principles (i.e. its norms) act in relation to 
and should be interpreted against the background of other rules and principles.’ See ILC Fragmentation 
Report, supra note 1, at para. 251. 
